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Available online xxxxIn recent years, a number of energy scenario studies which aim to advise policy makers on appropriate energy
policy measures have been developed. These studies highlight changes required to achieve a future energy sys-
tem that is in line with public policy goals such as reduced greenhouse gas emissions and an affordable energy
supply. We argue that behavioural changes towards energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles have considerable potential to
contribute to public policy goals andmay even be indispensable for achieving some of these goals. This potential
should, therefore, be reﬂected in scenario studies aiming to provide comprehensive advice to policy makers. We
analyse the role that energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles play in prominent recent global energy scenario studies and ﬁnd
that these studies largely ignore the potential of possible behavioural changes towards energy-sufﬁcient life-
styles.We also describe how such changes have been considered in several other scenario studies, in order to de-
rive recommendations for the future development of global energy scenarios. We conclude that the inclusion of
lifestyle changes in energy scenarios is both possible and useful. Based on our ﬁndings, we present some general
advice for energy scenario developers onhow to better integrate sufﬁciency into future energy scenario studies in
a quantitative manner.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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In recent years, a number of global, regional and country-level sce-
nario studies which aim to advise policy makers on appropriate energy
policy measures have been developed (e.g. European Commission,
2011; IEA, 2015a, 2015b; Jeffries et al., 2011; Nagl et al., 2011; Teske
et al., 2015). These studies highlight the changes that are needed to
achieve a future energy system in line with public policy goals such as
reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, reduced import dependency
and/or an affordable and reliable energy supply. Ideally, such scenario
studies should highlight the full range of credible options for achieving
these public policy goals available to policy makers and societies, who
should then choose the options they deem to be preferable or the
most promising (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015).
Lifestyles in which users consume less goods and services, have the
potential to make a considerable contribution to achieving public policy
goals associated with the energy system (Faber et al., 2012; Hallströmamadi), marie-christine.
d@wupperinst.org
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. This is an open access article under
fﬁciency in energy scenario s
//dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforet al., 2015; Stehfest et al., 2009; van Sluisveld et al., 2016). Consequently,
it might be expected that available scenario studies investigate to what
extent and under what conditions energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles can con-
tribute to these goals. This article analyses whether this potential is actu-
ally discussed in prominent global energy scenario studies published by
the International Energy Agency (IEA) and others. We contrast our ﬁnd-
ings from these studieswith selected energy and emission scenario stud-
ies which explicitly include the role played by energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles
in their respective scenarios. This article aims to contribute to the theory
and practice of energy scenario development by outlining the advan-
tages of including future lifestyle changes in scenarios in a manner that
is conducive to providing good energy policy advice.
In the next section (Section 2), we explain how we deﬁne the term
“sufﬁciency” for the purpose of this article. We do so by differentiating
sufﬁciency from efﬁciency and consistency and describing three types
of sufﬁciency. In Section 3, we discuss key characteristics of energy sce-
narios and demonstrate why it is important for energy scenario studies
to include scenarios highlighting the potential of future changes to-
wards more sustainable lifestyles. In Section 4, we analyse to what ex-
tent prominent global energy scenario studies published recently by
the IEA and Greenpeace et al. take the potential of sufﬁciency into ac-
count. We contrast the ﬁndings of this analysis by describing a number
of scenario studies that have assumed considerable future changes to-
wards energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles. Finally, in Section 5, we draw uponthe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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2 Another way for policymakers to reduce the demand for an environmentally harmful
product without restricting its sale is to make an alternative and less environmentally
harmful product more attractive. For example, public transport could be improved by in-
creasing its comfort level, its frequency and/or its reliability, ideally leading to a reduction
in car use. We consider such changes in goods or services to be a special case within our
sufﬁciency type B.
3 However, it may be justiﬁable to challenge the typical assumption in economic theory
that consumer preferences are formed in a sovereign way and that forced changes neces-
sarily lead to reductions inwelfare (e.g. Norton et al., 1998; Penz, 1986; Schubert and Chai,
2 S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxthe ﬁndings and arguments presented in the article to derive some gen-
eral advice for energy scenario developers and the broader research
community on how to better integrate sufﬁciency into future energy
scenario studies in a quantitative manner.
2. Deﬁning sufﬁciency
Depending on the scope of an analysis and the question to be an-
swered, different aspects and boundaries are highlighted in the deﬁni-
tion of sufﬁciency. The scientiﬁc discussion on sufﬁciency as a strategy
was, among others, coined by Wolfgang Sachs. He developed the idea
that the two strategies of efﬁciency and sufﬁciency should be combined.
“While efﬁciency is about doing things right, sufﬁciency is about doing
the right things” (Sachs, 1999).
Two authors who place the ethical dimension of sufﬁciency at the
centre of their research are Princen (2003) and Muller (2009). Both
point out that consumption limits should be deﬁned not only on an in-
dividual level, but also on a societal one. Princen (2003) argues that
“there can be enough and there can be too much.” Deﬁning limits of re-
source- and energy-intensive behaviour is one of the most difﬁcult and
debated aspects of sufﬁciency. Even though theremight be a broad con-
sensus in the literature of the existence of certain thresholds, determin-
ing these thresholds is highly contested. Muller (2009) holds the view
that energy sufﬁciency is a duty of all liberal societies to ensure social
justice and to avoid external impacts from energy consumption which
are harmful to other people.
There is a consensus among supporters of sufﬁciency that it can re-
sult in wellbeing and satisfaction. “Sustainable sufﬁciency is deﬁned as
achieving economic objectives consistent with the principle of right
livelihood, ensuring the preservation of the natural environment and
the welfare of each individual and society at large. […] The concept of
sustainable sufﬁciency focuses attention on unsustainable consumption
patterns within a society obsessed with maximizing short term eco-
nomic growthwhilst ignoring the reality of limits resulting from a ﬁnite
supply of natural resources” (Lamberton, 2005). This quote indicates
that the concept of sufﬁciency is closely connected to the degrowth
paradigm.1 If widely adopted, sufﬁciency can be expected to affect eco-
nomic growth, as it calls for a reduction in consumption levels. There is a
debate among researchers whether or not economic activity in afﬂuent
societies needs to be reduced in the future in order for human activities
to remain within planetary boundaries (Bergh and Kallis, 2012; Jakob
and Edenhofer, 2015; Loske, 2015).
For the purpose of this article, sufﬁciency is especially relevant in re-
gard to its potential to reduce energy consumption. It can be seen as an
option to reduce GHG emissions from the energy sector. In the follow-
ing, we develop a speciﬁc deﬁnition of sufﬁciency, bearing in mind
how sufﬁciency can be relevant in the development of energy scenarios.
In energy scenarios, political choices for achieving sustainability goals
are among the main drivers of the energy system. At the highest level
of aggregation, these options can bedivided into three pillars: efﬁciency,
consistency and sufﬁciency. Based on a literature review, these are the
three main categories of options for achieving sustainability goals (e.g.
Huber, 2000; Linz and Scherhorn, 2011; Mundaca, 2010).
Therefore, sufﬁciency can best be deﬁned by contrasting it with efﬁ-
ciency and consistency. Efﬁciency is an option in which the input-
output relation is improved (better). Fewer inputs of material or energy
are needed per service unit, or more services are produced from the
same amount of material or energy. Consistency aims at fundamental
changes in production and consumption by substituting non-
renewable resources with renewable resources (different from today).
A prominent example is the use of renewable energy sources instead
of fossil fuels. The option of sufﬁciency is linked to the level of demand
for goods and services – in this context speciﬁcally to the level of1 Degrowth can be deﬁned as “the intentional limiting and downscaling of the economy
to make it consistent with biophysical boundaries”, (Bergh and Kallis, 2012).
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be limited to a level which still allows for a “good life”. In industrialised
countries, fulﬁlling this requirementwould certainly lead to a reduction
in demand for such goods and services (less/enough) (Muller, 2009).
Regarding the implementation of behavioural changes towards
energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles, two general leverage points can be identiﬁed.
On the one hand, there is the purchase, rental and investment phase (e.g.
the purchase of a refrigerator, an apartment or a car). In this phase, suf-
ﬁciency policies target a reduction in the equipment rate and size, or
they promote the shared use of goods (“sharing economy”, as opposed
to individual ownership). On the other hand, reductions can be made
in the usage phase; for example by aiming to reduce journey frequency
or length, or by moderating room temperature choice in winter.
In terms of energy scenarios, sufﬁciency can be categorised by the
drivers that foster its implementation. Sufﬁciency in the context of
energy-intensive goods and services can be achieved by:
A) Modiﬁcation of individual preferences
A change in the preference structure of individuals, leading to
lower levels of consumption or more sustainable consumption
patterns, constitutes one type of sufﬁciency. In this type of sufﬁ-
ciency, changes in consumption are made voluntarily by individ-
uals and are not associated with any kind of sacriﬁce. The
associated preference changes can be the result of cultural
changes or changing societal ideas about what constitutes
wellbeing and a “good life” (Schneidewind and Zahrnt, 2014).
These changes may be triggered by a pioneer group causing
others to follow (Linz, 2012). Policy can try to induce preference
changes, e.g. through information campaigns or educational ini-
tiatives (Jackson, 2005). An example of the modiﬁcation of indi-
vidual preferences is a change in vacation patterns, when
destinations that can be reached by bicycle or public transport
are preferred over destinations that can only be reached by plane.
B) Modiﬁcation of relative prices
Consumer demand for goods and services can also be altered by
external incentiveswithout the premise of changes in preference
structures. Policies can achieve desired changes in the demand
for goods and services by changing their relative prices.2 An ex-
ample is an increase in taxation levels for energy or emission-
intensive goods and services. It should be noted that political
measures taken to inﬂuence the relative costs of goods and ser-
vices should ideally result inmarket prices thatmirror their actu-
al societal costs, as only then domarkets lead to a socially optimal
allocation of goods and services, according to economic theory
(Dahlman, 1979). In other words, any political modiﬁcation of
relative prices should be limited to the internalisation of external
effects, such as the health costs associated with air pollution or
the climate change damages caused by burning fossil fuels.
C) Politically imposed bans or limits
It is also possible to bring about a reduction in the demand for
energy-intensive goods and services by banning or limiting
their sale or use. From amicroeconomic point of view, such polit-
ical measures lead to “forced sufﬁciency” and have cost impacts
by cutting off certain options within consumers' individual pref-
erence structures.3 This third type of sufﬁciency is, therefore,2012). Furthermore, looking at society as a whole, orders and restrictions may result in
positive net effects if they lead to reductions in adverse ecological impacts and if the saved
resources are used, for example, to alleviate poverty.
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Fig. 1. Illustrations of our three types of sufﬁciency. a: In sufﬁciency type A, the location of
the indifference curve changes from I1 to I2 as a result of changing preferences in favour of
the environmentally benign product. This change in preferences leads to a reduction in the
demand for the environmentally harmful product and an increase in the consumption of
the alternative product, even though the relative prices of both products remain
unchanged. b: In sufﬁciency type B, the environmentally harmful product becomes more
expensive, for example due to higher taxation. Consumers can now afford less of this
product, which is reﬂected by the shift in the budget line from b1 to b2. As a
consequence of the change in relative prices, consumer demand for the environmentally
harmful product reduces, even though consumer preferences have not changed.
Consumers fall to the lower indifference curve I1⁎ because they can no longer afford the
combination of products on the indifference curve I1. c: Finally, in sufﬁciency type C, the
government prohibits the sale of the environmentally harmful product, resulting in the
new budget curve b2 running on the x-axis. Clearly, in this case, the demand for the
environmentally harmful product is reduced to zero (assuming the government is able
3S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxstructurally different from types A and B discussed above and, in
narrow deﬁnitions of the term, is not considered to constitute
sufﬁciency. An example of this type of sufﬁciency is the ban of
the use of private cars in city centers.
Fig. 1a to c illustrates the microeconomic differences between these
three types of sufﬁciency. For simplicity, each ﬁgure assumes that con-
sumers choose between only two products: one is environmentally
harmful while the other is environmentally benign. It should be noted
that the environmentally benign option does not necessarily need to
be a type of consumer product in the traditional sense; it could, for ex-
ample, be a walk in the park or another form of (non-material) activity.
Consumers are restricted in their demand for these two products by
their individual budgets and/or time constraints (indicated by the bud-
get line b). Their preferences are depicted by the so-called indifference
curves I. Each indifference curve represents those product combinations
which lead to the same utility for a consumer.
3. The need for energy scenarios to consider sufﬁciency
Scenario building is a method for anticipating possible future devel-
opments. Scenarios represent causal relationships between diverse
input parameters and describe, as output, possible futures within a
vast range of plausible future development trajectories. As policy is es-
sentially about choosing between different policy options which result
in different future outcomes, policy makers need to be informed about
the likely nature of these outcomes. The more complex the system is
that is addressed by policy makers and the more far-reaching their de-
cisions are, the more knowledge they need about the likely outcomes
of their decisions. The scenariomethod offers away to analyse and com-
pare the future consequences of different political decisions in a consis-
tent and transparent manner. The method is frequently used in the
energy policy domain, as this domain is characterised by long planning
horizons (e.g. in regard to power plants and energy infrastructure) and
complex technological, economic and social interactions. The scenario
method is therefore of special relevance for providing advice to energy
policy makers (Nielsen and Karlsson, 2007).
Scenario developers need to deﬁne external elements, i.e. elements
which they assume the scenario actors either cannot modify or do not
wish to modify. These elements, once speciﬁed (and possibly quanti-
ﬁed), can be referred to as a scenario's boundary conditions. Embedding
the interactions of a scenario's internal elements into a wider environ-
ment (the boundary conditions) is a crucial characteristic of scenarios
(Hamrin et al., 2007; Kahn and Wiener, 1967; Nielsen and Karlsson,
2007; Opaschowski, 2009; Reibnitz, 1987). Alternative human behav-
ioural options are represented in scenarios by varying the parameters
of their internal elements, allowing for an analysis of the interrelation-
ships between internal and external elements. This concept demon-
strates two different explanations of the unpredictability of the future:
a) The inability to predict the future development of factors that are
within the control of human beings, as the precise choices that
human beings will make cannot be anticipated4
b) The uncertainty of the status or evolution of the factors that human
beings either cannot control or do notwish to control (i.e. uncertain-
ty about the boundary conditions)
Consequently, the combination of these two types of uncertainty
leads to the unpredictability of the future. In scenario studies, the
boundary conditions are usually described in so-called storylines. The
distinction between factors that are within the control of human beings
on the one hand and boundary conditions on the other is important4 The term “human being” here refers to individuals as well as to the collective (i.e.
politics).
to fully enforce the ban), while demand for the alternative product increases.
Please cite this article as: Samadi, S., et al., Sufﬁciency in energy scenario studies: Taking the potential beneﬁts of lifestyle changes into account,
Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.09.013
4 S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxwhen considering how to integrate sufﬁciency into scenario analysis.
This is due to the fact that it leads to the question of whether sufﬁciency
should be introduced in scenarios through the storyline or through the
speciﬁc actions andmeasures of scenario actors such as policymakers or
societal groups.
While it is obvious that individuals and societies have signiﬁcant
choice about the type and volume of goods and services that they con-
sume, in most cases scenario developers treat consumption patterns
as an external element. If sufﬁciency is taken into account at all in a
study's scenarios, it is usually assumed to simply emerge – with no de-
tailed discussion on how the accompanying lifestyle changes are initiat-
ed (see Section 4). Fig. 2 depicts schematically a number of elements
that inﬂuence energy system development and how these are typically
classiﬁed within energy scenarios. Some elements clearly have to be
treated as external (e.g. fossil fuel resources), while others clearly
have to be treated as internal (e.g. taxation rates for different energy
sources). Additionally, there are a number of elements for which classi-
ﬁcation is less clear and these include sufﬁciency or consumption
patterns.
Scenario developers intending to integrate sufﬁciency into their sce-
narios need to decide whether to treat sufﬁciency as an internal or an
external element. We argue that it is preferable to treat sufﬁciency as
an internal element, i.e. a human behavioural option. Only by treating
sufﬁciency in this way can scenarios illustrate which political measures
or social dynamics need to be implemented or initiated in order to in-
duce energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles. Treating sufﬁciency as an external ele-
ment that may simply emerge in the future has a key disadvantage: it
may lead the readers of the scenarios, including policy makers, to be-
lieve that no measures need to be taken to promote energy-sufﬁcient
lifestyles.
Regarding energy scenarios, we see a particular need for these to
take into account the possibility of a future with lifestyles that are
based on sufﬁciency. Over the past two decades, there has been growing
concern among policy makers around the globe about the need to sig-
niﬁcantly reduce energy-related CO2 emissions in order to prevent the
worst possible consequences of global warming. National, regional
and global energy scenarios have, therefore, increasingly focused on il-
lustrating how signiﬁcant reductions in these emissions can be
achieved. Good policy advice should highlight all the possible options
for achieving political goals and leave it to political and societal debate
to choose the preferred options (Edenhofer and Kowarsch, 2015). We
argue that sufﬁciency is an important option for achieving GHG emis-
sion reductions and should, therefore, be reﬂected in energy scenario
studies. However, as the following section (Section 4)will show, today's
prominent global energy scenario studies largely neglect the potential
of sufﬁciency.Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of the differentiation between internal and external elements
in the energy scenario literature.
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tion is feasible by means of technological solutions requiring only
minor lifestyle changes (or no changes at all), despite the assumption
of further economic growth in all regions of the world. We argue that
a detailed look at the results and assumptions of the scenarios calls
this view into question. Speciﬁcally, we point out the following four as-
pects that we believe indicate the signiﬁcant risk of relying solely on
technology to achieve the desired major reductions in energy-related
CO2 emissions:
• Uncertainty about whether efﬁciency improvements can actually be
achieved
All mitigation scenarios assumemuch greater improvements in ener-
gy efﬁciency in the future than in the past.While in principle such im-
provements are technologically feasible, it is unclear whether society
will actually be able to achieve these potential efﬁciency improve-
ments and whether all the cultural, political and economic barriers
to greater efﬁciency can really be overcome. Furthermore, it can be ar-
gued that energy scenarios tend to overestimate the overall impact of
efﬁciency measures on energy reduction by neglecting possible re-
bound effects.5
• Uncertainty about whether the supply side can be transformed as
quickly as envisioned
On the supply side, the sustained introduction of new low-carbon en-
ergy technologies would be required on amassive global scale. For ex-
ample, in the IEA's 2DS scenario (IEA, 2015b), 21 GW of new nuclear
power plants are built every year on average in the period from
2026 to 2050, while in the recent past (2008–2012) there was an an-
nual increase of less than 3 GW. Likewise, new Concentrated Solar
Power (CSP) plants in the scenario are assumed to be installed at an
annual rate of 27 GW between 2026 and 2050, while annual installa-
tion in the recent past was less than 0.5 GW. While there may be no
actual technological barrier to increasing the use of each technology
on the scale envisioned in the scenarios, it is likely be a considerable
challenge from a system perspective to achieve the proposed increase
and parallel implementation of all the different technologies. This
challenge is further complicated by the fact that, simultaneously, the
energy system's infrastructure needs to be adjusted in order to ensure
a stable supply of energy.
• Mass implementation of low-carbon technologies may violate
non-climate related sustainability criteria
Relying heavily on supply side low-carbon technologies risks
neglecting sustainability criteria other than CO2mitigation. For exam-
ple, the use of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in combination with
either fossil fuels or bioenergy is associatedwith a number of negative
effects on the environment andonhuman health, caused amongother
things by airborne emissions (Corsten et al., 2013; Siirila et al., 2012).
Nuclear power, on the other hand, continues to provoke debate re-
garding long-termwaste disposal, its role in the proliferation of nucle-
ar weapons and the risks associated with potential large-scale
accidents or terrorist attacks (Ahearne, 2011). Even the use of renew-
able energy technologies can lead to undesired impacts e.g. on biodi-
versity or resource requirements (Kleijn et al., 2011; Viebahn et al.,
2015) if the implementation of these technologies is not carefully
managed. The level of risk associated with neglecting social and/or
ecological needs obviously increases relative to the scale of the imple-
mentation of these low-carbon technologies.
• The broad societal support required for successful transformation
cannot be guaranteed
Scenario studies show that achieving ambitious CO2mitigation targets
will require higher energy system investments than in a business-as-5 The rebound effect describes the phenomenon inwhich improvements in energy efﬁ-
ciency can lead to an increase in demand for goods or services. This increased demand
leads to additional energy consumption which can (partially) negate the original energy
savings.
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6 However, in the BAU scenarios of the analysed studies, consumptions patterns are ex-
pected to change in the future, as average income continues to increase. As in the past, per
capita demand for many products and services is expected to increase, including for
energy-intensive amenities like air travel, residential ﬂoor area or air conditioning.
7 We recognise that a case can be made to classify modal shift as efﬁciency rather than
sufﬁciency. After all, the overall volume of passenger transport does not change in the case
of modal shift, but merely becomes less energy-intensive. However, our view emphasises
the fact that people typically not only wish to travel from one point to another but also
wish to do so within a short time or with a certain level of comfort and ﬂexibility. Taking
these additional demands into account, it becomes clear that switching, for example, from
car to bus or from airplane to high-speed trainmaybe interpreted as switching to a service
which has other characteristics, some ofwhich are likely to be judged as less favourable by
a number of travellers.
8 It should be noted that both IEA studies include not only energy-related but also pro-
cess-related CO2 emissions from the industrial sector, while the study by Greenpeace et al.
does not account for process-related CO2 emissions.
5S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxusual scenario (IEA, 2015b; Teske et al., 2015). During the initial phase
of the transformation, these higher investments will not be offset by
lower fuel expenses. Accepting higher costs is likely to require broad
societal support for the transformation of the energy system. From
today's perspective it is unclear whether this support will be ade-
quate, especially given that stakeholders with vested interests are
likely to use these upfront costs to try to persuade the public to de-
mand a slow-down of the transformation process.
Similar arguments against focusing solely on technological solutions
in climate change mitigation are also put forward by other authors, in-
cluding Franceschini and Pansera (2015), van den Bergh (2013) and
van Sluisveld et al. (2016).
The doubts raised above about the prospects of attaining mitigation
pathways as described in published decarbonisation scenarios should
not be misunderstood. We wholly support efforts to signiﬁcantly in-
crease energy efﬁciency and to rapidly grow the share of renewable en-
ergy sources in energy supply. However, simply hoping for the ﬂawless
development of energy efﬁciency and energy supply decarbonisation to
materialise is, in our view, an over-optimistic assumption given the
highly complex nature of society and its energy system – and the con-
siderable risks associated with unmitigated or inadequately mitigated
climate change.
4. Sufﬁciency in global energy and emission scenarios – a literature
review
In this sectionwe consider the role that sufﬁciency plays in the liter-
ature on global energy and emission scenarios. The ﬁrst part of the sec-
tion reviews three recently released global energy scenario studies that
are frequently referred to in scientiﬁc and political discussions on the fu-
ture of the global energy system. We ﬁnd that these studies' scenarios
do not take sufﬁciency into account or do so only marginally. In the sec-
ond part of this section we contrast this ﬁnding by discussing selected
global energy and emission scenario studies that include scenarios
which assume changes towards energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles. These latter
studies are not as frequently cited in global energy and energy policy
discussions. Most of these studies also do not describe the global energy
system in detail, but instead either focus on certain types of energy con-
sumption (e.g. aviation) or investigate more generally all relevant
human-induced changes to the global environment. This two-step ap-
proach aims to highlight that on the one hand much of the prominent
literature on global energy scenarios lacks consideration of sufﬁciency,
while on the other hand energy and emission scenario studies released
in the past have shown that it is possible and useful to integrate sufﬁ-
ciency into energy and emission scenarios.
4.1. Examples of prominent recent global energy scenario studies
We initially consider three global energy scenario studies from two
different organisations to evaluate the role that sufﬁciency plays in
some recently released, prominent global energy scenario studies
(IEA, 2015a, 2015b; Teske et al., 2015). Two of the studies were pub-
lished by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the other one
was published by Greenpeace and two renewable energy industry asso-
ciations. Scenarios from these three studies were selected for this re-
view for the following reasons:
• All three studies include detailed descriptions of their scenarios, in-
cluding information about energy service demand.
• All three studies include ambitious mitigation scenarios (see Table 1),
meaning that potential emission reductions through lifestyle changes
would be especially valuable.
• The two IEA studies are part of two prominent series of scenario stud-
ies. Results from these series have been cited frequently byPlease cite this article as: Samadi, S., et al., Sufﬁciency in energy scenario s
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et al., 2016) and policy makers (European Commission, 2011; G7 En-
ergy Ministerial Meeting, 2016).
• The study commissioned by Greenpeace, GWEC and SolarPower
Europe is also part of a series of publications that has been cited by
many researchers, including the IPCC (e.g. Esteban and Leary, 2012;
Fischedick et al., 2011; Haley, 2012).
The following table provides an overview of the three scenario stud-
ies analysed and the energy systemCO2 emission reductions achieved in
each study's most ambitious mitigation scenario.6
Our analysis established that none of the mitigation scenarios in
these three global energy scenario studies explicitly assume that people
will signiﬁcantly modify their consumption patterns over the next de-
cades compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario.7 In all the stud-
ies' mitigation scenarios, behavioural changes are only assumed to take
place in the transport sector compared to a BAU scenario. All three stud-
ies explicitly assume in their most ambitious mitigation scenarios that
there will be a shift towards more energy efﬁcientmodes of transporta-
tion compared to BAU (higher shares of travel by rail, bus, cycling and/or
walking and smaller shares of travel by car and/or plane). As changing
the mode of transport requires users to make signiﬁcant behavioural
changes, the modal shift towards less energy and carbon-intensive
modes is here considered to be a mitigation option that can be classed
under sufﬁciency.8
In addition to this modal shift, two of the three studies (with IEA,
2015a being the exception) assume in their most ambitiousmitigations
scenarios that transportation volumes are reduced to some extent in
comparison to the respective BAU scenarios. In its most ambitious mit-
igation scenario the study by Greenpeace et al. (Teske et al., 2015) also
explicitly assumes the future purchase of smaller cars than in its BAU
scenario. Similarly, in their policy recommendations, the authors of
the Energy Technology Perspectives 2015 study (IEA, 2015b) suggest
that one way to make passenger road transport more efﬁcient is to
switch “towards smaller and/or less powerful vehicles”.
This indicates that in the transport sector some (limited) formof suf-
ﬁciency is taken into account in all of the scenario studies analysed. The
limited information provided by the studies indicates that this is mostly
assumed to be a collective form of sufﬁciency (our “type B” sufﬁciency);
for example, “massive policy intervention” (Teske et al., 2015) and
“travel demandmanagement” (IEA, 2015b) are mentioned as prerequi-
sites for achieving modal shift in the transport sector. The study by
Greenpeace et al. (Teske et al., 2015) states that in itsmitigation scenar-
ios “transport pathways do not rely on the very few idealists who al-
ways do ‘the right thing’. Among the policy measures proposed by the
study to reduce transport demand are “charge and tax policies that in-
crease transport costs for individual transport”. Furthermore, according
to the authors, cities particularly need to change “so that making the
‘right choice’ will be also the ‘easiest choice’”.
However, at the same time, the authors of the Greenpeace et al.
study (Teske et al., 2015) appear to suggest that some changes intudies: Taking the potential beneﬁts of lifestyle changes into account,
e.2016.09.013
Table 1
Overview of the analysed global energy scenario studies.
Sources: IEA, 2015a, 2015b; Teske et al., 2015.
Name of the study Organisation Publication date Change in energy system CO2 emissions
compared to 2010 in each study's most
ambitious mitigation scenario
by 2030 by 2050
energy [r]evolution – A Sustainable
World Energy Outlook 2015
Greenpeace/GWEC/
SolarPower Europe
September 2015 −32% −100%
Energy Technology Perspectives 2015 IEA May 2015 −16% −55%
World Energy Outlook 2015 IEA November 2015 −18% –
6 S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxindividual preferences leading towards energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles (our
“type A” sufﬁciency)will be required in the coming decades. “The trans-
port sector requires sufﬁciency especially in regard to usage of individ-
ual cars and aviation.” No speciﬁc reference to sufﬁciency or similar
remarks about the need for changes in individual preferences can be
found in the other scenarios analysed. Nor do we ﬁnd statements in
any of the three scenarios arguing that behavioural changes can or
should also be triggered by strict policy mandates (our “type C”
sufﬁciency).
While none of the analysed scenarios seem to include in their quan-
titative modelling more dramatic changes towards sufﬁcient lifestyles
(e.g. a reduction in demand for consumer goods), the potential for be-
havioural changes to contribute to sustainable development is
recognised as a central principle in the Greenpeace et al. study (Teske
et al., 2015). It stresses that “alongside technology driven solutions, life-
style changes […] have a huge potential to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions”. At the same time, the study states that “[n]o behavioural changes
or loss in comfort levels” are assumed for the quantitative scenarios.
Table 2 provides anoverviewof the types of lifestyle changes consid-
ered in themost ambitiousmitigation scenario of each of the three glob-
al energy scenario studies analysed. The table also contrasts the types of
lifestyle changes included in the scenarios with examples of lifestyle
changes that, according to the literature, can signiﬁcantly reduce energy
demand and CO2 emissions.
Table 2 suggests that, currently, many scenario developers are cau-
tious in quantitatively implementing assumptions about far-reachingTable 2
Overview of the types of lifestyle changes considered in the analysed scenario studies and
examples of additional types of lifestyle changes.
Sources: Faber et al., 2012; Hallström et al., 2015; IEA, 2015a, 2015b; Teske et al., 2015;
Tom et al., 2015; van Sluisveld et al., 2016.
Lifestyle changes explicitly (and mostly moderately) taken into account in each
analysed study's most ambitious mitigation scenario
energy [r]evolution – A Sustainable
World Energy Outlook 2015
• Shift towards more energy efﬁcient
modes of transportation
• Reduction in transportation volumes
• Use of smaller cars
Energy Technology Perspectives 2015 • Shift towards more energy efﬁcient
modes of transportation
• Reduction in transportation volumes
• Use of smaller cars (mentioned as one
way to increase efﬁciency)
World Energy Outlook 2015 • Shift towards more energy efﬁcient
modes of transportation
Examples of additional lifestyle changes that can signiﬁcantly reduce energy
demand and CO2 emissions, according to the literature
• Reduction in room temperatures in winter
• Reduction in ﬂoor area per person
• Reduction in the number and sizes of household appliances and their use
• Reduction in the purchase of consumer goods (incl. sharing consumer durables
with other people)
• Reduction in average meat consumption
Please cite this article as: Samadi, S., et al., Sufﬁciency in energy scenario s
Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforlifestyle changes. The analysed scenario studies assume limited behav-
ioural changes in the transport sector only, mostly in the form of
modal shift. The effect of these changes on total energy sector CO2 emis-
sions are limited. For example, in the Energy Technology Perspectives
2015 study (IEA, 2015b), modal shift and transport reductions com-
bined result in annual CO2 emission reductions in the 2DS scenario of
about 2.5 Gt by 2050 compared to the baseline scenario. This represents
only 6% of the overall energy sector emission reductions (41 Gt) by
2050. In contrast, technological solutions in the transport sector (more
efﬁcient vehicles and low-carbon fuels) are assumed to result in almost
three times this reduction in annual emissions (about 7 Gt).4.2. Global energy and emission scenario studies taking sufﬁciency into
account
The fact that the prominent global energy scenario studies analysed
in the previous sub-section only take marginal account of the potential
for lifestyle changes to reduce energy demand and GHG emissions may
come as a surprise. After all, other global energy and emission scenario
studies have, in the past, explicitly included scenarios assuming signiﬁ-
cant changes towards energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles. Some of these studies
are discussed in the following. While we limit our discussion to global
scenario studies, it should be noted that there are also some country-
speciﬁc scenario studies that have included scenarios assuming
energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles (e.g. Emelianoff et al., 2013; Prime
Minister's Ofﬁce, 2009; Skea et al., 2011). Furthermore, while our
focus is on studies released since 2000, some older energy scenario
studies have considered the future potential for lifestyle changes (e.g.
Carlson et al., 1980).
Among the most prominent international studies examining life-
style changes within scenarios are two publications by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Global Environment Out-
look 3 (Bakkes et al., 2004; UNEP, 2002) and Global Environment Outlook
4 (UNEP, 2007) both include one scenario that explicitly assumes life-
style changes compared to today and compared to a future BAUs
cenario. The reports develop distinct scenarios to gain a better under-
standing of possible future developments in various parts of the global
environment up to the year 2032 (UNEP, 2002) and 2050 (UNEP,
2007). In the “Sustainability First” scenario, people increasingly empha-
sise the values of solidarity, reciprocity, sufﬁciency and stewardship.
This shift in values is assumed to be driven mostly from the bottom up
by individuals and grassroots organisations, which become increasingly
involved in setting the policy agenda. Speciﬁcally, the authors note that
“as the limits of a top-down, policy-driven approach are realized, the
shift toward sustainability is increasingly accomplished through life-
style changes” (Bakkes et al., 2004). Not surprisingly, various indicators
of environmental damage are lower in the “Sustainability First” scenario
for the coming decades than in the three other scenarios presented by
each report.
The 2013 studyWorld Energy Scenarios by theWorld Energy Council
(World Energy Council, 2013) developed two different global energy
scenarios to 2050. These scenarios differ, among other things, in regardtudies: Taking the potential beneﬁts of lifestyle changes into account,
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demand in 2050 is 20% lower than in the Jazz scenario due to
environmentally-conscious citizens. Lower consumption levels are one
reason for energy-related CO2 emissions in the Symphony scenario
peaking by 2020, while they peak 20 years later in the Jazz scenario.
By 2050, energy-related CO2 emissions in the Symphony scenario are
less than half the level of those in the Jazz scenario (19 Gt CO2 compared
to 44 Gt CO2). However, the two scenarios also vary in the use of energy
supply technologies, with all the low-carbon electricity generation op-
tions (renewables, nuclear, CCS) being more aggressively supported in
the Symphony scenario compared to the Jazz scenario.
Of the four global scenarios developedwithin the European research
project PASHMINA (Sessa and Ricci, 2014), one scenario assumes that
consumption and travel needs will be considerably reduced by 2050
in comparison with the other three scenarios, as a result of pervasive
lifestyle changes. People in this “New Welfare” scenario are assumed
to become more concerned about wellbeing and quality of life than
about economic wealth. Instead of material consumption, education
and research are assumed to become central social values. Global GHG
emissions in the New Welfare scenario see a greater reduction by
2050 than in the other three scenarios, due mainly to lifestyle changes
but also supported by “radical changes of urban infrastructure, working
life and goods and services delivery schemes”.
Another European research project (Berghof et al., 2005) examined
the consequences of future developments in air travel up to the year
2050. One of the four scenarios developed in the CONSAVE 2050 project
is the “Down to Earth” scenario, in which changing values, regional life-
styles andhigh levels of environmental consciousness among the gener-
al public are assumed. In this scenario, the increase in global demand for
air passenger transport between 2000 and 2050 is limited to an average
annual rate of 0.5%, while the increase is considerably greater (average
annual rates of 1.5% to 3.8%) in the three other scenarios.
Finally, the Global Energy Assessment study, developed under the
lead of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(Johansson et al., 2012), presents a large number of mitigation path-
ways for the global energy system based on three distinct pathway
groups. One of these groups, the GEA-Efﬁciency group, emphasises de-
mand side efﬁciency improvements and also assumes somebehavioural
changes compared to today and in contrast to the other two pathway
groups (GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply). These changes are largely limited
to the transport sector, where shifts towards public transport and re-
duced car ownership are assumed. While energy demand is lowest in
the GEA-Efﬁciency pathways, cumulative emissions are similar in all
three pathway groups as GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply compensate for
higher energy demand by the greater use of low-carbon energy supply.
These studies differ in regard to the detail they provide in explaining
the assumed shifts in values and lifestyles and how these shifts are as-
sumed to be triggered. In the World Energy Council study (World
Energy Council, 2013), the PASHMINA project (Sessa and Ricci, 2014)
and the two Global Environment Outlooks (UNEP, 2007, 2002), changes
in values and/or in environmental consciousness are described and are
apparently assumed to emanate from within society, but little or no in-
formation is provided to explain what triggers these changes. The
CONSAVE 2050 study (Berghof et al., 2005) is more explicit, noting
that “heightened environmental consciousness might be brought
about by clear evidence that impacts of natural resource use, such as de-
forestation, soil depletion, over-ﬁshing, acidiﬁcation, and climate
change pose a serious threat to the continuation of human life on Earth.”
In the studies mentioned in the previous paragraph, policy changes
are not described as key triggers for more sustainable lifestyles, al-
though the twoUNEP studies (UNEP, 2007, 2002) and theWorld Energy
Council study (World Energy Council, 2013) suggest that policymakers
are expected to react to the new social norms by enacting policies that
foster more sustainable lifestyles. In contrast, the Global Energy Assess-
ment (Johansson et al., 2012) speciﬁcally focuses on policy measures
that can lead to or support lifestyle changes. It devotes several pagesPlease cite this article as: Samadi, S., et al., Sufﬁciency in energy scenario s
Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techforto a discussion of the potential role and possible limitations of govern-
ment policies to promote more sustainable lifestyles.
None of the analysed scenario studies suggest that policies banning
certain goods and services are required, viable or desirable.
5. Conclusion and advice for energy scenario developers
As indicated, recently released prominent global energy scenario
studies analysed in this paper barely take lifestyle sufﬁciency into ac-
count when presenting policy options. We have argued that this lack
of analysis of the potential of sufﬁciency to contribute to a reduction
in energy demand and GHG emissions is a weakness in energy scenario
studies which aim to provide advice to policy makers. We suggest that
future scenario studies should quantitatively assess the potential of suf-
ﬁciency. The quantitative potential of lifestyle and behavioural changes
should be highlighted more prominently in these scenarios and should
not be blurred by combining differences in lifestyle assumptions with
unrelated differences in energy efﬁciency and/or energy supply – as is
the case in some of the scenario studies discussed in the previous sec-
tion (Johansson et al., 2012; World Energy Council, 2013). Sufﬁciency
and changes in lifestyle should rather be embedded, discussed and
quantiﬁed independently of technology decisions. Ideally, studies
should also discuss and – as far as possible – model the impact on eco-
nomic activity of energy-sufﬁcient lifestyles.
Based on our analysis, we make ﬁve general suggestions to energy
scenario developers and the broader research community aimed at pro-
moting the comprehensive consideration of sufﬁciency in future energy
scenarios:
• With energy scenario studies typically comprising several diverse sce-
narios, sufﬁciency should be integrated in at least one scenario. It
should be integrated either in terms of an alternative storyline or –
ideally – in terms of a political and societal course of action.
• Narratives underlying the quantitative assumptions for sufﬁciency
potentials can help to illustrate the plausibility of the envisaged devel-
opment. Narratives can create a picture depicting sufﬁciency-oriented
lifestyles, can indicate how fulﬁlling theymay be and can highlight the
central issues that policy makers and society need to manage. A par-
ticipative development of these narratives can enhance their accep-
tance and their strength.
• In recent years, a number of studies have attempted to quantify the
potential of sufﬁciency measures (Faber et al., 2012; Hallström et al.,
2015; Stehfest et al., 2009; van Sluisveld et al., 2016). Future scenario
studies could drawon these studieswhen devising scenarios that take
into account lifestyle changes.
• Scenario studies dealing with lifestyle changes should also describe
the triggers for sufﬁciency. Scenario authors can learn from the
European research project SPREAD – Sustainable Lifestyles 2050 (see
Neuvonen et al., 2014), which considers, among other things, poten-
tial triggers that may lead to lifestyles that are more sustainable.
• Further advances in the following research areas may help to better
integrate sufﬁciency in future energy scenarios:
(1) Understanding the potential of sufﬁciency to help reduce energy
demand and respective emissions
(2) Identifying promising (political) strategies to support energy-
sufﬁcient lifestyles
(3) Understanding the dynamics and transformational potential of
bottom-up sufﬁciency initiatives
(4) Advancingmethods to properly integrate sufﬁciency into existing
energy modelsIf these general suggestions are taken into consideration, energy pol-
icy advice will be improved by outlining energy scenarios which high-
light the full range of available GHG mitigation strategies. Such
scenarios may be able to show policy makers and the public howtudies: Taking the potential beneﬁts of lifestyle changes into account,
e.2016.09.013
8 S. Samadi et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2016) xxx–xxxambitious climate change mitigation targets can be achieved without
relying on excessively optimistic technological assumptions, and may
possibly increase public support for changes to the lifestyles of the
more afﬂuent of the world's population.
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